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ADDRESS OF HON. JOHN W. KEPHART, JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
AT THE DEDICATION OF TRICKETT HALL.
Fellow Alumni of Dickinson School of Law: We
meet for the purpose of cdebrating the completion of
the first school building constructed through voluntary
subscriptions from the students who here received their
education in the law. Its erection marks an epoch in
this school's life, for it is the outward manifestation
chat proclaims to the sdhool world the ability of this institution to withstand the disappointments, pitfalls
and shoals which beset the growth or existence of every new institution. It evidences that its graduates are
men who have earned for themselves, since their gradLuation, places in the world; and from the remembrance
of the benefits here received, with an affection for their
school, and for all the sentiments that surround it, they
gave of their means that its success might be pellpetuated. Stilil greater than all these, this building speaks
of the intense loyalty, unswerving fidelity, and masterly leadership of men whose thoughts, labors and
greatest endeavors have always been for the honored
progress of this institution and its students. It is the
silent monitor that reminds every student of Dickinson
of the greatest teacher and instructor, greater to us
than all the teachers of the law in America, our beoved Dean, Dr. Trickett.
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Of those of us of the older school, (and we were
early in its history,) and those who have followed us,
our thoughts naturally cluster around the old brick
building on the corner, within whose dingy walls we
first received the light of legal learning. As our minds
drift back through the many years that have passed
since we were students, as we contemplate the great
changes now being wrought in the world's history, and
seek for a period in our lives that we may remember
as being the most significant, there is none that stands
out with more prominence than our student days at
Dickinson. It is -here that the fashioning of our future
took place. It is here we found that line that divides the
careless, light-hearted existence of youth from that life
which marks a more serious consideration of the matters of the world, the career that bids for us future
success or failure. Here we gathered, a lot of boys,
some with wild, untrained minds and habits of many
different varieties; others softened, subdued and
strengthened by the hand of toil. All hoped to emerge
as profound thinkers and men of wisdom, through a
course of law. To weld these varying emotionalisms into a homogeneous class, bent upon securir.g, at the appointed time, the completion of a well rounded legal
education, necessitated the labors of not only a genius
but of a master mind, someone who would apply
ciscipline, inculcate studiousness, encourage self-reliance, aid in the thoughtful application of legal
principles and excite in the mind the endeavor of inventive thought, so that the student might not only
be a learner and expounder of the law, but an originator of it; that principles worked out might be fairly
commendable to the sound reasoner or man of common
sense. As we labored industriously to master what
seemed most difficult and intricate subjects scientifically arranged to plague and harass our minds, we
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realized, as they were made clear, in our daily advance toward our wonted goal, that we were uncons3ciously absorbing a new and powerful influence, something that would remain with us until the end of time.
This influence was the wonderful personality of the
Dean. How it filled our ideas of correctness, how it implanted itself in the active life of each boy, is too well
known to the Dickinson law student to necessitate interpretation or repetition.
Let us remember, for we cannot forget, dear old
-Judge Sadler, the Dean's most capable assistant,
whose tenderness of heart and love for the boys
caused him often to break down what seemed
to us insuperable barriers that we might reap
(he full fruits of our labors at school. He made it much
easier for us to gain entrance to bars having a tendency at that time to be hostile, as we were a new institution. We all love and remember that kind, benevolent spirit, whose hair is now whitened by the years
of time. His reflections should give him unbounded
satisfaction with having spent an honorable, useful
life, secure in the affections of his pupils.
We had other most estimable instructors here
and in the academies and colleges, but of all these,
the one that stands out nost; prominently and vigorously and the one remernbered with most affection
as Dickinson's
central figure is Dr.
Trickett. This is bes evidenced when his name is
mentioned to former students.
The responsive cord
that it strikes, the tender affection with which it is
spoken, bespeaks more than the love for an instructor,
it bespeaks of an affection for the man himself. As in
the days of school life, When we regarded his views of
the law as final and the best, so today when courts are
in opposition to his views and go wrong, as they often
do, with a man from Dickinson, Dr. Trickett's views are
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still final and the best. Is there a lawyer here who cannot in fancy now hear Dr. Trickett forcibly denounce
the rule in the Sanderson case, even as we heard it
twenty years ago. This criticism formed the basis of
the opinion which is now the law of the State.
Dr. Trickett and Judge Sadler are inseparably connected with the Dickinson School of Law. We cannot
think of the law school without thinking of them, and
we cannot think of them without thinking of the law
school,. and when we talk of the law school we must
necessarily talk of them. Both have given muh to this
institution and its students. Dr. Trickett has given to
the boys the best that was in him, the best of his life.
His labor is reflected in the success of the students who
left here with their degrees. He consecrated himself to
this work and there is nothing that gives him more
pleasure than when he learns of the progress of one of
his boys from Dickinson. Though the Doctor has
grown old in the service, you can still catch the mani.
festation of a great interest when a pleasing reference
is made to one of his students.
We have reared here this building-this temple as it were-as a tribute to the love and esteem not
only for the school, but for Dr. Trickett and -his co3aborer, Judge Sadler. Our only regret is that they cannot be rejuvenated and today have that splendid vigor
of twenty years ago, and again assume the task
of shaping the minds of the future students Who
enter this institution. Without boasting, Dickinson
School of Law has a higher percentage of successful
men in the world today than any other similar institution of learning in the United States. This is due
to the wonderful personality, the wonderful course of
instruction, and the manner in which the Dean delivered it to the boys he taught. We all join in an expression -of loyal devotion to our school, and in a wish and

Dickinson Law Review

73

prayer that the Dickinson School of Law may always
be as successful as it is today, indeed, that she may
march onward as she has done in the past, and that her
labors may be crowned with successful men enjoying
responsible positions throughout the world, and for all
this we may look back to the figure that stands
supreme in the history of the Dickinson Law School,
Dr. Willian Trickett.

RULES OF COURT OF THE DICKINSON SCHOOL
OF LAW ADOPTED JANUARY 1, 1919.
1. The Moot Court of the Dickinson School of
Law shall be divided into sections correapondtng in
name, jurisdiction and methods of procedure to the
different courts of Pennsylvania.
2. Sessions of the court shall be held every
Tuesday and Friday of the school year at 11:30 A. M.
3. Two cases shall be argued at each session of
the court, unless otherwise specifically ordered by the
faculty member in charge.
4. Students assigned as counsel and judge shall
ascertain from the faculty member in charge the date
upon which their cases will be called for argument.
5. All proceedings shall be instituted and prosecuted in the appropriate section of the court as determined by the law of Pennsylvania and all papers
shall indicate the court in which the .nltter is pendIug; e. g., "The Orphans Court of the Dickinson School
of Law," and they shall take a number corresponding
to the number of the case and term corresponding
to the last month of the school term in which the case
is argued. All cases shall be headed in briefs and
opinions in the following form:
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A. B.

In the

Court of the

vs.
Dickinson School of Law.
Term, 191 .
No.
f
C.D.
Brief of Counsel for Plaintiff (or Defendant) or
Opinion of the Court. (as the case may be.)
6. All cases shall be treated as cases pending in
a court of Pennsylvania and shall be decided in accordance with the statutes and decisions of the courts
of Pennsylvania, and the rules of court of the appellate courts of Pennsylvania and of the Courts of Cumberland County sihall control any question to which
they are applicable, except where the matter is governed by these rules.
COUNSEL.
7. The student whose name is first Tmentioned
at the end of statement of facts shall represent as
counsel the party plaintiff in the trial court; the second student named shall represent the defendant in
the trial court.
ARGUMENTS.
8. Students assigned to cases must argue their
cases in person unless unavoidably prevented, in which
case a brief may be submitted without argument or
the argument may be continued to a later session of
the court in the discretion of the faculty member in
charge. Counsel are prohibited from reading their
briefs but may read appropriate quotations from opinions of the courts or from statutes.
9. The oral argument of counsel shall consist of
the following:
A. A concise statement of the facts.
B. A statement of the questions of law to which
the facts give rise.
C. A statement and explanation of counsel's contention as to how each question
should be answered.
A
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D. A statement and explanation of the reasons
and authorities sustaining such contention.
10. Where the statement of facts indicates .that
the argument is upon a motion, an affidavit of defense in the nature of a demurrer or on appeal, the.
moVing party or the one who has filed such affidavit
of ddfense or taken the appeal shall argue first. In
other cases counsel for the plaintiff shall argue first.
Arguments in rebuttal may be made in,the same order.
11. The student judge and the faculty member
in. charge may properly interrupt counsel at any time
to ask for information, to criticise the argument or ask
for further discussion of particular points but no interruption by opposing counsel iq perminsible.
12. When the facts have first been stated, opposing counsel will be called upon to state whether
they have been stated correctly; and likewise when.
the first speaker has defined the question of law involved, opposing counsel shall at once declare whether
or not he accepts the statement as satisfactory and if
not, to state the question as he conceives it.
BRIEFS.
13. Each attorney shall prepare a written brief,
in triplicate; one for the faculty member in charge,
one for opposing counsel and one for the student judge.
Copies shall be delivered to opposing counsel And the
faculty member before ten o'closk A. M. of the day
preceding the day of argument.
14. A brief must comply with the following rules:
A. It must be written or typewritten on one side
only of paper of legal cap size.
Bi. A margin of an inch and a half shall be left
at the left hand side of each page.
C. It must be securely fastened with brads at
the. top and it nivat be folded in the proper manner for
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folding legal papers for filing. Al papers shall be covered with a proper brief cover, properly indorsed as
follows:
(a) Name of the court.
(b) Number and term.
(c) Names of parties.
(d) 'Tlaintiff's Brief" or "Defendant's Brief" or
"Opinion."
(e) Name of student submitting the brief or
opinion.
D. The original statement of facts shall be retained by counsel first named thereon and shall be
fastened at the top of his brief to be handed to the
faculty member in charge.
E. Every brief must contain:
(a) A proper heading as provided by Rule 5,
supra.
(b) The statement of facts.
(%) A 'history of the case showing, in so far as
possible, in what court the original proceeding was intituted; what relief was sought; the defense interposed; the result in the court in which the proceeding
was commenced, and the manner in which the case
came to be presented for determination to the court
for whose consideration the brief was prepared.
(d) A statement of the questions of law involved. This must be in the briefest

and

most general

terms, without names, dates, amounts or particulars
of any kind.
(e) An explanation as to how the question is
involved in the case and why it will control the decision.
(f) The argument, which must comply with the
following rules:
1. If more than one question is involved, they
shall be separately stated, numbered, and the discus-
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sion of each question shall be separately stated and
given a corresponding number and proper title.
2. Each proposition shall be separately stated
and numbered and its b'earing upon the question involved explained.
3. Subordinate propositions shall be so placed
and numbered as to indicate that they are subordinate
and as to what proposition they are subordinate.
4. A brief will be suppressed and a new one required whenever it fails to comply with these rules or
shows inadequate preparation.
OPINIONS.
.15. The student judge shall hand his opinion and
the briefs of counsel to the Dean within ten days after
the day of the argument.
16. The student judge will be required to write
a new opinion whenever the opinion first submitted
is deemed inadequate for any reason.
17. An opinion, as upon an appeal, will be written by a faculty member and handed to the student
Judge, who shall exhibit it to the counsel involved and
return it to the Dean within two days after its receipt.
CITATIONS OF AUTHORITIES
18. No case shall be cited unless the names of
the parties are given, the volume and page in which it
is. reported, its date, and- the principle for which it is
cited, the latter to be placed on a separate line.
19. Cases m-ust be cited by the official name of
the report, if there be such name, and not by the name
of the reporter; e. g., 5 Pa. 1, and not 5 Barr 1.
20. Whenever a- statute is cited,. a reference
shall also be made to the volume and page of the Pamph-let lgwa and to the volume and page of the digest
in wbich it may be found.
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21. The abbreviations used for the names of law
books shall be those given in Corpus Juris. No other
abbreviations shall be used.
22. Counsel shall certify that whenever cases
are cited from jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania,
it is because there are no Pennsylvania cases in point
or because there is a conflict in the authorities. In the
latter case, the Pennsylvania cases must be cited and
if not approved, the objections to them must be set
forth. If lower court decisions are cited, counsel shall
certify that they have not been affirmed or reversed.
ATTENDANCE.
23. Each session of Moot Court shall be attended by all the members of the class of which the student
judge and counsel are members and a record of attendance will be kept by the faculty member in charge.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE DURING THE SILENCE
OF CON-GRESS.
1. Regulation by Judicial Discretion
By Article 1, Section 8, paragraph 3, of the Federal Constitution, the power to regulate commerce
among the states was delegated by the several states
to Congress.
It was no doubt intended and anticipated that the
words "among the states," qualifying commerce, would
entail the running of a line through the commerce of
the country, setting apart as a proper subject for federal legislation that which, from its nature and importance, ought to be regulated with a view to the
national interest, and in accord with the national will.
A reasonablt interpretation of the Constitution leaves
no doubt that the intention was that any regalati6n
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enacted by Congress within the delegated sphere should
be the supreme law of the land upon the subject. The
Constitution, however, does not guarantee that Congress will enact legislation to regulate all the commerce that is affected with national interest, and, as
a matter of fact, Congress has never chosen to occupy
more than a small part of the entire field. No power
is delegated to any other federal agency to prescribe
the "rules by which comnerce is to be governed" when
Congress fails to act. What is the status of this unexercised power? Have the states parted with it absolutely, or was their grant to Congress conditioned upon the exercise of the power conferred?
The terms of the grant and the purpose of the
Constitution, as drawn from its four corners, give no
definite clue to the solution of this problem. It would
be a fair implication that the states parted with all
their right to control interstate commerce. On the other hand, the Constitution specifically prohibits the
states from exercising certain kinds of interstate and
foreign comnerce control, such as the levying of duties of tonnage, laying duties on exports and
in ports, etc.,
and it has been argued that
the fact that the sum of these prohibitions is not
sufficient to deny the states the whole field indicates
that some power to regulate interstate commerce was
reserved to the states. If this was the case, it is apparent that, with the exception of the prohibitions
just referred to, the Constitution fails to set any limit
upon the extent to which states many control interstate commerce while Congress is silent. It could therefore be reasonably contended that under the Constitution a state's right to regulate interstate commerce is
limited only by the several express constitutional prohibitions, and by the .extent to which Congress has
chosen to legislate on the subjec,--that if legislation
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by a state affecting interstate commerce does not fall
within the express constitutional prohibitions, and
Congress has not legislated upon the subject, its validity cannot be called into question because of repugnance
to the commerce clause.
The preceding paragraph seems to set forth the
only reasonable implications that can be gathered from
the Constitution concerning this phase of the fundamental law. The Constitution would warrant an appraisal of state power to regulate interstate commerce
during the silence of Congress either at nullity, or at
infinity,-always excepting of course, the express constitutional prohibitions. The Supreme Court, however,
bas followed neither of these courses. It has taken
middle ground. That there are cases in which states
may regulate interstate commerce is fully established.
It is just as well established that the possibility of being superseded by congressional action is not the only
limitation to which the power of the states
is subject. State regulations are frequently nullified by the
Supreme Court although no federal regulations conflict with them. It is said that the subjects covered by
such legislation can be regulated only by Congress.
A familiar classification is the following: that
the commerce of the country is of three kinds, (1) the
strictly internal commerce of a state, in which the
state has plenary power, and Congress has no right to
interfere; (2) where it is only the exercise of the power of Cbngress that is incompatible with state regulation; and (3) where it is the existence of the power of
Congress that excludes the (power of the states.1
It must be realized at the outset, then, that in
defining the power of the states to regulate interstate
commerce while Congress is silent the Supreme Court
'See Covington,

&f-

Bridge Co. vs. Kentucky, 1,54 U. S. 209.
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has deserted all constitutional basis and guidance for
the princiles which rule its decisions, and that it is
acting solely and entirely upon its own discretion. The
rules which it applies are -founded on its own notions
of expediency, and not upon the mandates of Congress, Dr the expressed intentions of the framers of
the Constitution. No amount of scruting of that instrument will reveal the principles according to which
some subjects of interstate commerce are reserved
exclusively for regulation by Congress, while others
may be regulated by states pending action by Congress. During the silence 'of Congress the Supreme
Court itself clearly regulates interstate commerce,-"prescribes the rules by -which it is to be governed,"though Congress is the- only federal agency to which
the Constitution ascribes that function.
The Supreme Court frequently makes efforts to
produce the illusion of a constitutional background for its
decisions as to the extent to which states may regulate
interstate commerce while Congress is quiescent. There
is manifest a disposition to avoid the appearance of
measuring state power by the power delegated to Congress by the Constitution. Those cases in which the
silence of Congress is said to indicate its will in various respects seem an especially palpable attempt to
make it appear that the power exercised by the Supreme Court proceeds from Congress.
It is found upon examination, however, that the silence of Congress'
as interpreted by the Supreme Court is a variable
quantity. In numerous instances in which state regulations have been held void, it has been asserted that
the silence of Congress indicated its will that such
commerce shou3d be free and untrammelled,-that is
to say, unregulated.' In cases in which the right of the
ISee, for example, Hall vs. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485.
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state is sustained, it is frequently said that the silence of Congress is to be taken as a declaration of intention not to disturb what exists, and is the mode by
which Congress adopts the state law. The subterfuge
of resorting to the presumed will of Congress when Congress has not made known its will cannot disguise the
fact that the will of the Supreme Court and not that of
Congress is being effectuated.
This part -of the discussion may accordingly be
summed up as follows: There are state regulations
which affect interstate conmmeree, and those of which
do not; those which do not will be held valid so far as
the commerce clause of the Constitution is concerned;
those which do, will, in the absence of federal regulalion preempting the field, be declared void or voidable,
as seems good 'to the Supreme Court. When it is said
that the existence of the power of Congress is incompatible with the exercise of a certain power by the
state, all that is meant is that the Supreme Court is
not willing -that the state should exercise such power
under any circumstances. When it is decided that it is
only the exercise of a power by Congress that is incompatible with the exercise of a certain power by a state,
the meaning is that, until Congress speaks, the Supreme Court is willing that the state should exercise
the power.
With the ground thus cleared, it will be proper
to examine the rules by which the courts apply their
discretion in measuring the power of the states to
regulate interstate commerce while Congress is silent.
2. Discrimination
A state may enact regulations which give prefer'Parkersburg

and 0. River Transportation. Co. vs.

Park-

ersburg, 107 U. S. 691; County of Mobile vs. Kimball, 102 L.
S. 691; Southern Ry. Co. vs. King!, 217 U. S.524; etc. etc.

Dickinson Law Review

83

ences to its citizens as against the citizens of other
states. This, of course, could not be permitted. A comXmercial equilibrium must be maintained. The inevitable result of allowing a state to discriminate against
other states would 'be the enactment by the states
prejudiced of retaliatory measures, and there would
soon prevail the identical state of affairs whieh it was
perhaps the chief aim of the Constitution to supersede
and forestall. Harmony and utiny would disappear;
the federal system would disintegrate.
As a means of
preventing such. dissensions among states, the Supreme Court has annulled state regulations wherever
it Is shown that they place citizens of other states at
an unfair disadvantage.
In Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, Welton had
been convicted in a state court of violation of a statute wh1ch imposed a penalty for peddling without a
license, and provided that "whoever shall deal in the
selling of patent or other medicine, goods, wares, or
merchandise .................... which are not the growth, produce or manufacture of this State, by going from
place to place to sell the same, is declared to be a peddler." No license was required for selling in a similar
manner the growth, produce, or manufacture of Missouri. The statute was an open attempt to discrinmnate against the growth, produce, and manufacture ot
other states, and it was inevitable that it should be declared void. As Justice Hughes has tersely put it, "Interstate trade was not left to be destroyed or inpeded
by the rivalries of local governments."'
A statute may in effect produce discrimination,
though, by its terms, unlike the one in Welton v. Mis.'ouri, it purports to apply equally to all. The case of
"'Houston & Texas Ry Co. , vs. United States, 234

-49, (350).

U. S.
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Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, concerned a statute of the State of Minnesota which required animals
to be inspected within the state twenty-four hours
before slaughter as a condition precedent to the sale
within the state of fresh meat from such animals.
The statute by its necessary operation excluded from
the State of Minnesota sound meats, slaughtered and
prepared in other states, thereby giving a preference
to those who prepared meats within the state.
In determining the question of the validity of the
TMnnesota statute, the Supreme Court, failing to find
or to rely upon guidance from the Constitution, could
exercise its discretion in btit one reasonable way,-by
annulling the statute in so far as its operation worked
discrimination against meat dealers in other states.
3. Control or Possibiltty of Control by More Than
One State.
(a) O(peration of a State's Law Beyond its Boundaries
A second limitation, usually, though, as will be
seen, not always placed upon the qtates, is that their
power over interstate commerce cannot be exerted beyond their territorial confines. Covington &c Bridge Co. v
Kentucky, 154 U. S. 209, is a leading case standing for
this proposition. The State of Kenutcky undertook to
establish maximum rates of toll which should apply on
an interstate bridge. Congress had not expressed its
will on the subject. The Bridge Company was the complain'ant. There was no allegation that the rates attempted to be prescribed were confiscatory. There was
notMhing to indicate that the citizens of Ohio,-at the
other end of the bridge,-were prejudiced by, or in any
way dissatisfied with, the prescribed tolls. The sole
ground of objection was that the State of Kentucky
was attempting to regulate interstate commerce.
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Not very substantial reasons seem to have been
advanced to sustain the decision that the state had
exceeded its power. This could be expected from the
fact that the only difficulty seen in the enforcement
of the Kentucky statute was such as it was feared
might develop, but which had not yet become real.
The court professed to see in the state regulation of
tolls the "posibility of controversies of a serious nature." Each state might, for exarmple, endeavor to encourage imnigration from the other. "Suppose the
agent of the Bridge Company in Cincinnati should refuse to recognize tickets sold urpon the Kentucky side,
enabling the person holding the ticket to pass from
Ohio to Kentucky." "Or suppose the State of Ohio
should authorize such agent to refuse a passage to
persons confing from Kentucky who had not paid the
toll required by the Ohio statute; etc., etc." It was
pointed out that the State of Kentucky, by the statute in question, attempted to "reach out and secure
for itself a right to prescribe a rate of toll applicable
not only to persons crossing from Kentucky to Ohio,
but from Ohio to Kentucky," a right which practically
annulled "the corresponding right of Ohio to fix tolls
from her own State." In the opinion of the Supreme
Court it seemed to .follow that "Congress, and Congress alone, possesses the requisite power to harmonize such differences, and to enact a uniform scale of
cbarges which will be operative in both directions."
As all the evils apprehended involved controversies between states, it might not have been unreasonable to refuse to nullify the Kentucky statute untii
such coitroversies should arise, if indeed they ever
would arise. Courts do not usually busy themselves
with defending rig4hts, either of individuals or of
states, until the party whose rights are invaded comes
before the court as a coniplainant. It is hinted that
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the "difficulty" might be solved by "mutual legislation" of the two states concerned. But if niutual legislation would suffice, why should. it not have been a
satisfactory arrangement if the State of Ohio had been
willing to acquiesce in the tolls prescribed by the State
of Kentucky? If the Bridge Company could not establish the fact that the tolls prescribed were unreasonably low, to what relief was it entitled, and what
equity had it to invoke the commerce clause?
The result of giving the Bridge Company a standing in court under such circumstances,. and of giving
it the relief preyed for, was to free it from a regulation which had not been shown .to be unfair to it, and
which, so far as it appears, was acceptable to the citizens of both states involved, and perhaps 'even neoessary for their protection. It does not appear with any
great clearness just how these tolls were to be regulated. "Congress alone has the power," it was said,
but Congress bad not exercised the power and might
never exercise it. It was said that the Bridge Company
could not charge tolls at its pleasure, and that "there
is al-ways the implied understanding with reference to
these structurds that the charges will be reasonable,
and the question of reasonableness must be settled as
ot6er questions of a judicial nature are settled, by
evidence in the particular case." By this it can scarcely be meant that the judiciary is the only branch of
the government that has the power to iegulate tollS,
for, if Congress has the power, there is a clear admission that the rate fixing power is a prerogative of the
legislative branch. If a legislative body has the power, why did the legislature of the State of Kentucky
not have it? The argument seems to have swung the
complete circle, and nothing very definite seems to have
been decided except that, for the time being at least,
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the .Bridge Compny was free to charge whatever tolls
it chose.
If the State A is not inclined to acquiesce in the
operation within its borders of a statute of the State
B, there can be no £doubt that the Supreme Court
wisely destroys the extra territorial effect of B's statute. As disinclination to acquiesce might be manifested in various ways.-by complaint, for example, that
B's statute discriminates in B's favor, or by the passage by A of a statute mihose terms conflict .With B's
statute. The ca-se is not so clear, however, where the
terms of B's statute, operating in the territory of A,
are acceptable to the citizens of A. The denial of B's
power in such a case serves no purpose of increasing
or maintaining harmonious relations between A and
B, and, as has been said, Pay deprive both states of
much needed xegulation. A complaint from the facilfty or interest regulatd that it is being deprived of
due process stands on a different ground. Butt if such
a ,plea.is made, it .vould seem to be a confusion of issues to concede additional weight to it because the
regulation complained of happens to control interstate
commerce.
To allow the State of B to control operations
which have passed beyond its territorial limits would
involve some interesting, but probably not unsolvable.
problems in the law of conflicts. It would scarcely be
possible, of course, for the State A to enforce such
law as its own, inflicting penalties for violation simply
because A had no complaint to make of the operttion
of the law in its ter-riory. Nor could B's process be
. alidly served in A.
But, where commerce is carried
on between A and B, the subjects, instrumentalities,
agencies, and operatives are usually within the
jurisdiction of both states, and the state B should not
experience insuperable difficulty in compelling com-

Dickinson Law Review
pliance with its statute through its control of that
part of 'the operatio Which is within its own territory. Enough of the res is within the jurisdiction of
B to permit the enforcement of B's law even if the
transaction dioes leave the state, or origqnate in another state. The law of conflicts would furnish numerous precedents in which compulsion is exercised extrater'ftorilly through the control which a state ta
over such part of a res as is within ift own boundaries. Had the courts chosen to look at the instant
question in this way, there would probably have been
no great practical difficulty in enforcing the opposite
decision in the Covington Bridge Case during the time
that the State of Ohio saw fit to acquiesce in the
Ken'tucky statute.
In Hanley v. Kansas Cty Southern Railway Company, 187 U. S. 617, a railway company brought a bill
in equity for an injunction against the railway commissioners of he State of Arkansas to restrain them
from enforcing certain rates. Goody had been shipped
from a point in Arkansas to another point in the same
state, pasgsing en route, however, through Indian
Territory. The rate charged was in excess of that prescribed by the Arkansas Commission, and that body
had decided that the railway company was liable to a
penalty. It was said by the Supreme Court: "The
transportation of these goods certainly went outside of
-Arkansas, and we are of opinion that in its aspect of
commerce it was not confined within the state. Suppose that the Indian Territory were a state and should
try to regulate such traffic, what would stop it? Certainly not the fiction that the commerce was confined
to Arkansas. If it could not interfere the only reason
would be that' this was commerce among the states.
But if this commerce would have that character as
against the state supposed to have been formed out of
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the Indian Territory, it would have it equally against
the State of Arkansas. If one could not regulate it, the
other could not." A decree for the plaintiff was sustained. The Covington Bridge Case is cited in support
of the decision.
Simtilarly it has been decided that navigation on
the high seas between ports of the same state is subject to regulation by Congress, and is not subject to
regulation by the states. In Pacific Coast Steamship
Company vs. Railroad Commissioners, 9 Sawyer 258,
the court held that "to bring the transportation within the control of the state, as part of its domestic com-inerce, the subject transported must be within the entire voyage under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
state." Wabash Railroad Company vs. Illinois, 118 U.
S. 557, follows this principle with regard to rate regulation, though the case goes further and denies a state's
right to control a rate even as to such jpart of an interstate transportation as lies within its own boundaries.
A state law which by its terms purports to regulate only internal commerce may incidentally have
quite a potent extraterritorial effect. A discussion of
the decision in wihat has been known as the Minnesota
Rate Cases' would be relevant in this connection. The
railroad commission of the State of Minnesota had issued orders effecting reduced schedules of rates applicable to internal traffic. "A scheme of state rates,
framed to avoid discrimination between localities with'It was held, however, in Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. vs.
Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, that a state tax against a railroad corporation, incorporated under its laws, on account of
transportation done by it from one point within the state to
another point within it but passing through part of another
state, is not a tax upon interstate commerce. See also Bwing
vs. -Leavenworth, 226 U. S. 464.

'Zizripon vs. 8bephord, 220 U. S. 36L.
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in the state, and to provide an harmonious system for
intrastate transportation throughout the state, naturally would embrace those places within-t he state which
are near the state's boundaries, and when these are ineluded in the general reduction of intrastate rates,
there is, of course, a change in the relation of rates as
theretofore existing to points adjacent to, but across
the state line." A correct rate adjustment would require that points without the state. should be served on
practically equal terms with adjacent points within the
state. One of the grounds on which the carriers sought
relief from the order of the Minnesota Commission was
that its order had in effect regulated interstate commerce, inasmuch as a reduction in the intrastate rates
necessitated a corresponding reduction in the interstate rates to points outside, but adjacent to the state.
The regulations of the Minnesota Commission
could not, of course, be invoked to comtpel the carriers
to reduce their rates to the adjacent external points.
If, however, the carriers had maintained their rates to
these points on the previous levels, such points would
have competed with points in Minnesota at a disadvantage. When such a state of affairs is brought to the
attention of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that
body is held to have authority to compel the bringing
of interstate and intrastate rates into a proper relation
with each other." Assumnng that the intrastate rates
established by the Minnesota Commission in this case
were reasonable, the adjustment which the Interstate
Commerce Commission could have ordered would probably have involved a reduction of the interstate rates
to the intrastate levels. It is entirely conceivable that the
courts would find means of effectuating such results
even in the absence of the Act to Regulate. Co nmerce
'The Shreveport Rate Cases. 234 U. S. 342.
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and the machinery of the Interstate Commerce Commission. However that may be, it seems clear that,
assuming that the carriers were not in position to dispute with success the reasonableness of the rates fixed
by the Minnesota Commission, they had not much
choice but to reduce the interstate rates. If they were
to avoid the charge of discrimination against points exterior to Minnesota, they must in effect permit the
State of Minnesota to establish the basis for some of
their interstate rates.
The decision that the Minnesota Commission had
not exceeded its powers is not inconsistent with the
doctrine of the Covington Bridge Case, since it is probably not unreasonable to make a distinction between
the incidental external effects of the order of the Minnesota Conimission, and the- calculated external operation of a statute such as that in the Covington Bridge
Case. The principle upon which the decision of the
Minnesota Rate Cases rest, however, might well have
been invoked to produce the opposite result in the
Covington Bridge Case. Speaking of the state's power
to prescribe interstate rates, Justice Hughes remarks:
"To say that this power exists, or that it may be exercised only in prescribing rates that are on an equal
or higher basis with those that are fixed by the carrier for interstate transportation, is to maintain the
power in name while denying it in fact." The wording
is significant. When a state commission prescribes intrastate rates, it is obliged to consult the reasonable
needs of the carriers,-to comply with the terms of the
fourteenth amendment,-but it is not obliged, to regard
the effect of such rates on interstate rates established
by the carriers.
Justice Hughes realized that the carriers were the
complainants, and that the only complaint which should
5,n equity be hear.d .fronr them was that the rates pre-

Dickinson Law Review
scribed were too low. If the shippers from an adjoining
state had been the complainants, or if the intrastate
rates had affected rates prescribed by the Interstate
Cominerce Commission, a different question would have
been presented, and the validity of the order of the
Minnesota Commission would have been put to a different and much severer test, in spite of the fact that
it purported to be effective only within the State of
Minnesota.
A well established exception to the rule in the
Covington Bridge Case exists in the case of interstate
ferries. In Port Richmond Ferxy vs. Hudson County.
234 U. S. 317, a result was reached which seems to have
been considered consistent with the Covington Bridge
Case, but which can scarcely be reconciled with it. It
was there held that it is within the power of the State
of New Jersey to prescribe rates of ferriage from its
own shore to the shore of New York, and that the
State of New York has the corresponding right to prescribe rates in the opposite direction.
Possibly it was thought that no violence was done
to the doctrine of the Covington Bridge Case if each
state exercised control within its territory over the
act of selling tickets to the opposite shore. As a matter
of fact, the decision meant that each state was to be
p-ermitted to prescribe a toll for carriage part of which
was beyond its boundaries. The court might readily
have adduced all the arguments which were used in the
Covington Bridge case to deny state power. A more
sensible view was adopted, however, and the quotation
which follows could have been used convincingly in the
Covington Bridge Case. "There are a multitude of such
ferries throughout the country, and, apart from certain rules as to navigation, they have not engaged the
attention of Congress. We also put on one side the
question of prohibitory or discriminatory requirements,
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or burdensome exactions imposed by the state, which
may be said to interfere with the guaranteed freedom
of interstate conmerce or with constitutional rights of
property. The present question is sinply one of reasonable charges. It is argued that the mere fact that
interstate transportation is involved is sufficient to
defeat the local regulation of rates, because it is said
1hat it amounts to a regulation of interstate commerce.
But this would not be deemed sufficient ground for
invalidating the local action without considering the
nature of the regulation and the special subject to which
It has never been supposed that because of
it relates .......
the absence of Federal action the public interest was
unprotected from extortion, and that in order to secure
reasonable charges in a myriad of such different local
instances, exhibiting an endless variety of circumstance, it would be necessary for Congress to act directly or to establish for that purpose a Federal agency.
The matter is illuminated by the consideration of this
alternative, for the point of contention is that, there
being no Federal regulation, the ferry rates are to be
free from all control."
Carried to its logical conclusion, the Covington
Bridge Case would require that a state should not be
permitted to prescribe a rate or any other condition of
carriage beyond points within its own boundary lines,
even if such lines are in midstream of rivers. From the
practical standpoint, however, so severe a doctrine is
not necessary. If due process is accorded the ferry companies and the rates prescribed are not unduly low, a
satisfactory and frictionless adjustment is secured.
The adjustment would no doubt be just as satisfactory
if the State of New Jersey could prescribe charges for
round trip tickets, so long as the State of New York
forbears to attempt to prescribe any different rates.
Just as satisfactory and frictionless an adjustment
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would no doubt have prevailed if the statute of Kentucky had not been nullified in the Covington Bridge
Case.
(b) Operation of a State's Law Within Its Own Boundaries
It is conceivable that intercourse between the
states would be embarrased even though a state regulation were effective only to the boundary line of the
enacting state, if, upon crossing the boundary into another state, the transaction becomes subject to another
statute of different requirements, althoukh no valid exception could be taken to the reasonableness of either
statute standing by itself, and operating upon transactions wvhich do :not pass beyond the state. If, by way of
illustration, State A requires that railroad trains be
equipped with -one type of brake, and a statute of State
B requires another type, a train operating in both
states must carry both types or must stop at the state
boundary, and passengers and goods must be transferred to other cars. No ease seems to have been presented to the Supreme Court in which there were involved statutes of conflicting terms. What cases there
have been, have uniformly involved but a single statute, and, where the statute has been annulled, it has
been because of the embarrassment which would result if another state should enact a statute of conflicting terms. What has been said as to the wisdom of
annulling statutes out of nere apprehension of trouble,
would seem to apply with even greater force in cases
of this sort, where the complications which arise from
extraterritorial operation of laws are not present.
Hall vs. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, is a case in point,
An Act of the Legislature of Louisiana required that
no regulation of any company engaged in the business
of carrying passengems upon railroads, steamboats,
and other public conveyances, should make any dis
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crimination on account of the color of the passenger.
The statute was by its terms limited to persons engaged in such business within the state, and the violation of the statute which brought the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court involved a case of intrastate transportation on a steamboat. The act was declared invalid so far as it applied to vessels engaged
in interstate commerce. "It was to meet just such a
case that the commercial clause of the Constitution
was adopted. The river Misissippi passes through or
along the borders of ten different states, and its tributaries reach many xxxore ................. If each state was at
liberty to regulate the conduct of carriers while within its jurisdiction, the confusion likely to follow could
not but be productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary hardship ................. No carrier of passengers'
can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself
or comlfort to those employing him, if on one side of a
state line his passengers, both white and colored, must
be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the
other be kept separate."
The fact that no oYther state through whose
jurisdiction the steamboat travelled seems to have
made any rule which would have required a separation
of colored from white persons does not seem to have
been of sufficient weight to engage the attention of
the Supreme Court. The decision certainly cannot be
.iustified on the ground that steamboat operators were
put to actual inconvenience by being compelled to
change their methods of doing business upon leaving
the State of Louisiana. No law prevented compliance
with the terms of the Louisiana statute in all the
states in which the steamiboat operated. Further,
nothing in the case shows that the statute was considered unreasonable in itself,-that it could have been
said to deny due process had it affected only intrastate

Dickinson Law Review
commerce, though obviously it would have been somewhat difficult and enbarrassing at that time to invoke
the fourteenth amendment for the purpose of invalidating an act giving equal rights to negroes.
The Supreme Court insisted upon deciding the
case not upon the state of facts actually presented for
its consideration, but upon the facts as they would
have been if other states beside Louisiana had passed
laws which would have compelled the defendant to conduct his business in a different manner from that prescribed by the Louisiana statute. Perhaps the subject
matter of the statute is responsible for the conclusion
and the method of arriving at it. Perhaps it was felt
that the circumstances demanded that some theory be
.found which would support an annullment of the statute. Itis to be noted that a way has been found to hold
valid statutes of opposite tenor. States are held to be
within their rights in enacting that carriers must provide separate accomnodations for white and colored
persons.'
The distinction drawn between such eases and Hail
vs. DeCuir is not convincing. In the several instances
the State Supreme Courts, fearing no doubt the logic
of Hall vs. DeCuir, have held that state laws requiring that separate accommodations be furnished for the
two races were applicable only to intrastate travel. The
United States Supreme Court, taking as conclusive
the interpretation of the state laws given by the highest tribunals of the states, has held that the statutes
cannot be repugnant to the commerce clause because
they do not affect interstate commerce. Itis true that
in Hall vs. DeCuir the Louisiana statute was held to
apply to interstate travel, though not to interstate
'L. N. 0. ,&T. R. Co. vs. Afississippi, 183 U. S. 587; C. &
0. R. Co. vs. Kentucky, 1,79 U. S. 880;

Ferguson. 163 U. S. 5O.
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travel outside the state, but, as has been pointed out,
Hall vs. DeCuir went to the Sulpreme Court on a statement of facts whidh involved violation of the statute
on an intrastate journey. Nothing in Hall vs. DeCuir
called for an application of the law of interstate commerce except the fact that the steamboat was used in
interstate commerce. In those cases which treat of
.itatutes requiring separate acommodations, however,
iio consideration whate er is given to the nature ot
the travel done by the d6nveyances, though it seems
impossible to believe that these did not at times cross
state fines. Perhaps race antipathy is responsible in
Hall vs. DeCuir for commerce law of doubtful value.
It seems that the cases discussed in this paragraph
can be reconciled on only one theory. One common
principle runs through them all,-that the white and
colored race ought not be compelled to travel together, and may be compelled to travel separately.
In N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. Co. vs. New York, 165
U. S. 628, a conclusion was reached differing from
that reached in Hall vs. DeCuir. A New York statute
regulated inter alia, the heating of steam passenger
cars. The statute was a4plicable to cars in the state
whether en route to or from another state. Counsel
for the railroad company suggested to the Supreme
Court that "a conflict between state regulations in respet to the heating of passenger cars used in interstate commerce would make safe and rapid transportation impossible; that to stop an express train on its
trip from New York to Boston at the Connecticut line
in order that passengers ,may leave cars heated as required by New York to get into other cars heated in
a d1ifferent manner in conformity with the law of
Connecticut, and then at the Massachusetts line to get
into cars heated in still another mode, as required by
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the laws of that Commonwealth, would be a hardship
upon travel that could not be endured."
The decision was that these Ipossible inconveniences could not affect the question of the state's power to make such reasonable regulations for the safety
of passengers on interstate trains as in its judgment,
all things considered are appropriate and effective. In
Hall vs. DeCuir 'the bare possibility of such inconvenience warranted an annullment 9 f the statute; in the
case just discussed, the actul inconvenience apparently would not warrant an annullment.
In the case of South Covington Ry. Co. vs. Covington, 235 U. S. 537, the City of Covington had enacted
an ordinance requiring that an electric rallway company, operating from Covington across the Covington
Bridge into Cincinirati, should, inter ,alia, (1) run a
certain number of cars, carrying not .more than a certain numlber of persons in each, (2) provide rails or
barriers to protect passengers riding on platforms, and
keep cars ventilated and fumiglated, and (3) keep cars
heated at 50 degrees Fahrenheit. With regard to the
requirements as to the number of cars to be run, it
was held that "if Covington can regulate these matters, ceftainly Cincinnati can, and interstate business
might be impeded by conflicting regulations." Hall vs.
DeCuir is then quoted to the effect that "tonihmerce
cannot flourish in the nfidst of such embarrassments."
In spite of the fact, however, that the City of Cincinnati might also regulate the conditions under which
passengers might be permitted to ride on the platforms -of cars, this part of Covington's ordinance was
called valid as only "incidentally" affedting interstate
commerce. Undisputed testimony showed that it was
unreasonable to require cars to be heated to 50 degrees Fahrenheit, and this part of the ordinance was
annulled because of its unreasonableness,--not, ap-
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parently, because it had offended under the commerce
clause, but because it denied due 1process.
There are numerous other cases in which the same
principle is involved. In Wabash &c Ry. Co. vs. Illinois,
118 U. S. 557, the right of the State of Illinois to regulate rates for so much of an interstate carriage as lay
within its borders was denied.! In Smith vs. Alabama
,i24 U. S. 465, the State of Alabama was held to have
the right to prescribe qualifications for railway engineers, whether or not such engineers in the course
of their duties operated trains across the boundary
lines of the state. In Atlantic Coast Line vs. Georgia,
234 U. S. 280. a state statute was upheld prescribing
the type of headlight to be used on locomotives operated within the- state, though sudh locomotives frequently passed out of and back into the state.
It is apparent from the above cases that one of
the tests a pplied to state regulations is as to the
amount of confusion and embarrassment that would occur if more than one state should attempt to control
the same res by laws whose terms are inconsistent.
Where the court apprehends that too much confusion
and embarrassment could result, the statute is annulled. Where it is considered that no difficulty of this
soxt is to be feared, the state regulation is held valid,
provided other reasons for its invalidity are not discovered.
The wisdom of annulling state legislation affecting
interstate commerce before there is actual conflict with
legislation of another state has already been questioned. It is not to be doubted, however, that there is a
basis &lr distinction as to the amount Gf embarrassment which could arise if there were such conflict. Every transaction or operation of interstate commercs
has, by definition, a situs of some sort in more than
one state, so that a state which enacts legislation
' f. Port Richmond Ferry v. Hudson County, 234 U. S. 317.
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w,hich affects interstate commerce in any way is atternlting to control a res of which only a part is within its territorial jurisdfeion. Legislation affects cominerce, however, with varying degrees of directness,
and, although state regulaiions of interstate commerce
may have their undoubted effect upon such commerce,
the possibility of control by more than one state is not
always present, and, where it is present, the amount of
embarrassment which can arise from it will vary.
Many of the instrumentalities and agencies of interstate commerce have a permanent physical situs within
a single state. The danger that commerce will be embarrassed by conflicting state regulations applicable to
such instrumentalities and agencies is practically nil.
Barring the remote possibility Vhad. such agencies and

instrumentalities will become subject to the law of another state operating extraterritorially, courts need not
speculate upon the amount of embarrassment which
will arise from control by r~re than one law if a
state undertakes to construct a bridge over a navigable
water within its boundaries," or if a state enacts laws
requiring guard posts to be placed on bridges and trestles,'1 or if it attempts to protect surface crossings in
cities,' or regulates wharves, piers, and docks."
The case is different where legislation is applied
to agencies and instrumentalities which have no permanent physical situs within a single state, but move
from state to state. Comnnerce is likely to be embarrassed if each state in which such agencies and instrumentalities are present applies a different rule to
them. Much embarrassment might arise if steamboat
"Cardwell vs. American Bridge 'Co., 113 U. S. 905.
'N. Y., N. 13. & H. R. R. Co., vs. New York, supra.
"Rail-ay Co. vs. King, '217 U. S. 324.
"Packet Co. vs. Aiken. 121 U. S. 444.
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companies have the alternative of changing state room
ac-donranodations at state boundaries, or of navigating
up to state lines and no further." Perhaps less embarrassment would result if different requirements for
heating cars were in effect on opposite sides of a state
line; and still less if adjoining states prescribe different qualifications for locomotive engineers.' It is not
apparent that commerce would be greatly embarrassed if
each state through which an interstate carriage takes
place were to prescribe the rate which. should be applicable for so much of the journey as lay within its
own borders." It would seem that not much embarrassment would arise if Covington and Cincinnati should
pass different regulations as to the minimum number
of cars which are to be run on a single electric railway,
for, presumably, one city would have no objection if
the railway coznpany complied with an ordinance of the
other city -requiring a greater nunber. The contrary
miglht be the case if the two cities prescribed different
teniperatures that should be maintained on such cars.
Probably no enibarrassment would arise fron conflicting regulations as to tfhe speed of interstate, trains, '
or requiring that railway employees of interstate railroads be paid twice a-month."
'Great success will probably nbt attend the efforts
of one who attempts to reconcile the results of the
cases according to the distinction propounded above,
but there will be no greater success, and probably
less, if other distinctions declared by the courts are
used. The difficulty may no doubt be laid largely to
the inconsistency of the Supreme Court. That tribunal
"Hall

vs. DeCuir, supra.

'-inlth vs. Alabama, supra.
Wabash &c R. Co. vs. Iliinois, supra.
"'Erbvs. Morosch, 177 U. S. 584.
1 Erie R. R. Co. vs. Williams, 233 U. S. 685.
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frequently fails to speculate upon the difficulty which
can arise from conflicting legisation. If this test were
consistently applied, it would seem that nothing could
have savetl the car heating and headlight legislation
referred to above. As might be expected, the Supreme
Court has in perhaps most cases been governed by the
practical aspects of the problems by which it has beea
confronted, rather than by hypothecated difficulties.
The rational and logical decision is in favor of a reasonable state regulation which is not in fact in conflict with legislation of other states. Commerce needs
to be regulated, and Congress frequently fails to supply the regulation needed. These considerations have
no doubt in many cases led to the upholding of state
legislation Which must certainly have been annulled if
the court had chiosen to follow strictly the doctrine of
Hall vs. DeCuir.
Regulations which do not offend under the principle of Fall vs. DeCuir seem to be referred to frequenfly as only "Incidentally" or "indirectly" affecting coiy.er.ce. In South Covington Ry. Co. vs. Covington, supra, it was said that the provisions of Covington's ordir.ance requiring barriers for the _protection
of passen'gers rjiding on platformis, and requiring fumigation and ventilaticn of cars, affected comhaerce only
"incidentally." This was the "terminology by which
tbose provisions were distinguished from the void provisions cf Covington's ordinance,-void because Cincinnati Wculd earberrass coanrierce if it attempted to
regulate the same matters.
The directness of the effect of a regulation upon
interstate commerce would appear to be a very difficult thing to rreasure, and it cannot be said that the
cases furnish any test for its measurement. The words
indirect and incidental, as used in this connection,,
must be considered to be descriptive of the result of a
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test, rather than of a test itself. The words seem especially apt to express a conclusion that, in the particular case, the danger of embarrassment from control by more th.an one state is considered negligible.
In general the words are only the terns by which the
Supreme Court expresses its view, based upon such reasons as seem good to it, that a state regulation need
not be annulled.
Regulations having an incidental effect ulpon commerce are frequently said not to be regulations of commerce "within the meaning of the Constitution." In
Sherlock vs. Alling, 93 U. S. 103, it was said that "legislation iray in a great variety of ways affect comnerce and persons engaged in it without constituting
a regulation of it within the meaning of the constitution." Of the regulation in N. Y., N. H. and H. R.,R. CoI
vs. New York, supra, concerning the heating of cars, the
Supreme Court said: "Nor is it within the meaning of
the Constitution a regulation of commerce, although
it controls in scu.e degree the conduct of those engaged in such commerce."
The above expressions are typical. Several objec.
tions may be lodged against them. In the Xirst place,
it is quite inrossible to decide whether or not a regulation is a regugalticn of interstate comnmerce by the inquiry as to whether it is such a regulation within the
meaning of the Constitution, for obviously the constitution gives no aid on the subject. To say that a regulation is not a regulation of interstate commerce within
the meaning of the Constitution is to say no more than
that it is not a regulation of interstate commerce within the opinion of the Supreme Court,-if it is to say
even as much as that. In the second place, it is entirely
reasonable to define any legislation which affects
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interstate commerce, however remotely, as a regulation

of interstate conmnerce, and this definition has been
adopted for the purpose of this discussion.
The Supreme Court's declaration that a regulation
is not a regulation of interstate comnmerce is usually
m]ade perplexing by other invonsistent declarations. In
N. Y., N. H. & H. &R. R. Co. vs. New York, supra, after it was said that the regulation concerning the
heating of cars was not a regulation of comnerce
within the meaning of the Constitution, the court continued: "Until replaced by such legislation as Congress
may rightfully establish under its power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and anong the several states, the validity of the statute, so far as the
commerce clause of the Constitution ds concerned,
cannot be questioned." The fallacy is obvious and is
frequently met with. If the statute is not a regulation
of cormnerce within the meaning of the Constitution,
how can Congress enact such a statute by virtue of
its commerce power?
Cases of the type of Hall vs. DeCuir are frequently differentiated from those of the type of N. Y., N.
H. & H. R. R. Co. vs. New York, by the statement that,
While legislation in the former is a regulation of inteistate c'c.'.erce, thlat in the latter is an exercise of
the police power. This aspect of the question will be
treated in a subsequent section.
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MOOT COURT
HARRIS v. RAILROAD COMPANY
Negligence-Damages-Loss of 'Earning Capacity-Evidnee
STATEMENT OF FACTS
HarriW wife was injured by the negligence of the R. R.
Co. She lived two years and then died. Harris sues for damages. The Court allowed him to receive the present worth of
what would have been her probable earnings for her life if -the
accident bad not occurred. The Court refused evidence that although she 'had 'been earning ten dollars a week, two weeks .before the accident, she had then, in accordance with the offer o
her son to pay her five dollars per week if she ceased to labor.
given up her employment.
Shea, for plaintiff.
]Seltzer, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BHIEALY, J. The question which presents itself in this
case is whether the Court erred in not admitting the latter evideuce. The five dollars per week paid by the son to his mother
in order that she cease to work, became the amount which the
mother earned. Her earning power was five dollars per week.
This evidence should have 'been admitted.
In Hertzberg v. Pittsburgh Taxicab Company, 243 Pa. 541,
the court taid, "The expense of employing a servant for household work which a wife cannot do because of her injury is a
item of loss for which the husband may recover. The five dollars in this case which the wife received from her son was in
lieu of her working and receiving ten dollars per week. There
is no doubt that if the wife had been earning the ten dollars per
week at time of the accident he could recover same." Frysinger
v. Philadelphia R. T. Company, 249 Pa. 555; Wdllis v. Second
Avenue Traction Company, 189 .Pa. 430; Ruse v. Pittsburgh Railway -Ccmpany, 247 Pa. 295.
Hence, the logical conclusion would be that if she were
io cease work on condition that she receive five dollars per
week, the five dollars would represent her earning capacity at
the time of the accident. This view has been sustained by the
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authorities cited, and entitles the husband to recover the same.
The evidence should have been admitted.
OPINION OF THE SUPR M]E COURT
The trial court allowed a recovery by the husband bf the
present worth of what would have been her probable earning
for her life, if the accident had not occurred. This could not be
correct, unless, had she lived and earned, all her earnings
would have benefited him. He is not entitled to her earnings
and she being injured or killed, he can claim only the present
wor h of the annual pecuniary benefit, of which the injury or
death deprives him, and not of the entire earnings. Saunders
v. Rys. Co., 252 Pa. 79; 255 Pa. 348.
It was error to refuse evidence that the wife had desisted
from labor, at the solicitation of her son on his promise to give
her $5 per week. The jury should have been allowed to decide how long this arrangement would probably have lasted, and
to take as her earnings, for that period, $5 instead of $10 per
week. The husband .ould probably have received a pecuniary
benefit, weekly, from the wife's receipt of $5.00, but that benefit
would very probably be less than $5. per week.
JudgIment reversed.

